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Abstract
This note analyzes the existence of a possible media bias by determining
the impact of automobile manufactures’ advertisements on the probability
that German car magazines review their products. By accounting for pos-
sible endogeneity, we find a positive impact of advertising volumes on test
probability.
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Media bias and diversity of opinion are standard issues not only in (media) eco-
nomics but also in political and communications science as well as in journalism.
However in economics both concepts have recently been rediscovered with the
emergence of the concept of two sided markets (see Rochet & Tirole, 2003).
Moreover, many countries such as Germany, the U.S., the UK and Australia
either already have reformed or at least intensively discussed to reform the com-
petition law with respect to media mergers. The most important indicators when
assessing intra-media and cross-media ownership are of course diversity of opinion
and media bias.
Media bias and limited neutrality can take several shapes. Stories, news or –
generally speaking – coverage can be biased due to incorrect reproduction of facts,
misreports, the selection of news or badly performed search of facts. A media
bias therefore always exists when the media are (intended or not) not objective,
not completely honest or neutral with their reporting. Obviously, a completely
unbiased coverage is very unlikely even if it is produced incidentally. However,
only a systematic bias is likely to lead to permanent too high information cost
and therefore to a sustained deadweight loss.
A typical and often-cited type of bias is the so called political bias which is
some kind of an ideological bias and not necessarily profit oriented.1 Of course, in
case that a political bias follows the preferences of the recipients it is also suitable
to maximize profits. A completely different type of profit-oriented bias arises
from the interdependence of recipients and advertising markets. As advertising
volumes are frequently the most important source of revenues newspapers and
magazines, e.g., can have severe incentives to increase the demand for advertising
space in order to increase revenues (and ceteris paribus also profits). Thus, in
case that coverage can be an adequate instrument to expand the demand for
advertising space – e.g., by benevolent reporting – coverage is likely to be biased.
1The New York Times for example has frequently been accused to have a liberal (and
therefore biased and non-neutral) viewpoint. Other ideological biases are, e.g., ethnic or racial
bias, class and religious bias.
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From an advertising customer’s point of view, biased coverage can then be seen
as a free of charge advertising. A slanting media is then suitable to increase the
demand for the advertising customer’s products.
In ordinary one-sided markets with negligible cost of biased coverage biased
reporting would always have at least a non-negative effect on profits. In two-sided
markets however the effect of biased coverage can either be stronger or weaker.
As long as readers like advertising (i.e., network effects from the advertising to
the reader market are positive) a media bias will always have stronger effects than
in one-sided markets. This is due to the reinforcing impact of two-sided network
effects. With higher amounts of advertising a higher demand for copies follows
which in turn leads to a stronger demand for advertising volumes. In case that
readers dislike advertising a trade-off between advertising and circulation exists
though. An increasing demand for advertising space (and therefore an increasing
number of advertisements) would then reduce the demand for copies and vice
versa. The incentives for biased coverage would definitely be lower when reader
are ad-haters.
Studies on media bias have a long tradition in journalism and political science
(see, e.g., Glasgow University Media Group, 1982; Herman and Chomsky, 1988).
With the invention of the theory of two-sided markets also an increasing number
of economic studies dealing with media bias from different perspectives can be
observed. An outstanding theoretical paper on political media bias from an
economic perspective is Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005). The authors analyze the
newspapers’ incentive to distort the news coverage under both monopolistic and
competitive markets structure. It is assumed that not only contents are biased
but also that readers are characterized by their subjective beliefs which they like
to see confirmed. Newspapers are then likely to (as Mullainathan & Shleifer
put it) slant the stories toward these beliefs. Generally speaking, Mullainathan
& Shleifer find that competitive forms might have a stronger incentive to bias
coverage. Opposite results are provided by, e.g., Anderson & McLaren, (2007)
and Gentzkow & Shapiro (2006a).2 In contrast to Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005)
2See also Gal-Or et al., 2012, Gronnevet, 2009; Blasco et al., 2011
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both papers find that competition is likely to reduce the media bias in case that
readers are not able to judge the validity of the coverage. However, most of
these studies are more or less dealing with a political media bias and only few
analyze the incentives to slant content toward the advertising customers’ beliefs.
Exceptions are Hamilton (2004) and Ellman & Germano (2005).
Similar as for the theoretical studies also holds for empirical papers on media
bias. Gentzkow & Shapiro (2006b) as well as DellaVigna & Kaplan (2007) and
George & Waldfogel (2003) analyze the existence of a political media bias from
different perspectives. Again only few deal with the impact of the advertising
customers’ behavior (see Dyck & Zingales, 2003, and Reuter (2002) and Reuter
and Zitzewitz, 2006). Both Reuter (2002) and Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) test
the impact of advertising on wine ratings and mutual fund recommendations,
respectively.3 Reuter (2002) as well as Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) find evidence
for the existence of biased content. Magazines seem to slant their financial rec-
ommendations and wine reviews, respectively, towards their biggest advertising
customers. Both studies are therefore closely related to our study.
Our study also aims at analyzing the existence of a possible media bias pro-
voked by the interrelation of reader and advertising markets. Adding on the
existing literature the impact of advertising volumes on the probability of a car
manufacturer’s product being reviewed is analyzed. Choosing car magazines
comes with several advantages. At first data are disposable and can easily be col-
lected from the magazines. Furthermore, the probability of a car being reviewed
is far more objective than judgements on a ”left-wing/right-wing”-scale which
often has to be constructed in studies of media bias due to political news.
To identify a possible media bias, we use data on the two largest German car
magazines, Autobild and Auto, Motor und Sport. The overall circulation of the
magazines covers about 70% of the relevant market. The magazines also show by
far the largest number of advertising volumes in comparison to other competitors.
3A similar study can be found at Gambaro and Puglisi, 2010. See Dunham, 2011, for a
analysis on political media bias.
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2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Data and identification strategy
To analyze the manufacturers’ probability of being reviewed we use data on the
most important German consumer car magazines, the weekly Autobild (AB) and
the biweekly Auto, Motor und Sport (AMS) over the period of 1995–2002 and
1992–2007, respectively. By this means we obtained information on over 412 (416)
issues and on 31 (39) car manufacturers’ as well as on their advertising volumes.
During these periods more than 700 (600) models have been reviewed in AB
(AMS) using single reviews and about 1130 (2140) models in AB (AMS) have
been reviewed in a comparative test. Given that models of each manufacturer
can potentially be reviewed (either in a single review or in a benchmark test) in
each issue of the magazines information on over 11000 reviews (and non-reviews)
are available for AB and AMS, respectively.
In order to analyze the test probability a dummy variable (Test) is generated
which is equal to one when any of the car manufacturer i’s models has been
reviewed in issue t (see Table 1 for some descriptive statistics) and zero otherwise.
Furthermore we use variables such as ads which is the total (average) number
of advertising pages of each automobile manufacturer per issue, the monthly
manufacturers’ market share, the total number of pages per issue and a dummy
variable equal to one for German car manufacturers. We also use dummy variables
to account for time and group effects. We furthermore use several lags of the
number of new car releases as we expect that a higher number of a manufacturer’s
new releases increases the probability that one or more models will be reviewed
in on of the following issues.
As we assume that advertising volumes have impact on the probability of being
reviewed, of course, also the reverse effect may hold. In case that automobile
manufacturers can influence the car magazines behavior it is also reasonable to
assume that a high (low) frequency of reviews leads to a decrease (increase) in
this manufacturer’s advertising volume. We therefore use instrumental variable
methods to account for this possible endogeneity.
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Table 1: Data
Variable Mean Mean Min Max
AB AMS AB AMS AB AMS AB AMS
Test 0.15 0.21 0.36 0.40 0 0 1 1
Ads 0.53 0.87 0.90 1.24 0 0 12 20
German 0.23 0.26 0.42 0.44 0 0 1 1
Pages 88.49 219.75 20.12 47.32 56 101 168 384
Market share 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.0002 7.35 · 10−07 0.15 0.15
New registrations 44,245.09 40,727.98 42,951.47 41,141.55 247 0 199,121 199,121
New releases 5.97 7.97 18.38 28.08 0 0 326 834
Our identification strategy is based on two sets of variables. At first we assume
that past car registrations have significant impact on advertising. Since new car
registrations have a direct impact on manufacturers’ market shares, producers’
marketing strategy may somehow depend on car sales. In case that producers
loose market shares, we would expect that marketing revenues are likely to be
increased. Even though marketing strategies are planned a couple of months in
advance there is also room for short-term sales promotions to respond to recent
demand fluctuations. We therefore use up to eight lags of car registrations as
instrumental variables in order to account for inter-temporal effects. Secondly,
car manufacturers typically advertise new models some months in advance of
their official market appearances. Hence, advertising volumes should also depend
on future car releases. We use up to eight leads of the monthly new car releases
as instruments to account for dynamic effects. Finally, the brands’ market shares
are included to instrument advertising volumes assuming a connection between
advertising and market shares (see Schmalensee, 1972).
2.2 Results
At first, we use simple probit methods by regressing our left hand side variable
Test on manufacturers’ advertising volumes, the German dummy, the contem-
porary number of new releases as well as two lags of car releases. As one can
see from the second column in Table 2 and 3, ads is positive and statistically
significant. An increasing number of advertising pages by a specific car producer
seems to have a positive impact on the likelihood of being reviewed. Moreover,
German cars show a higher test probability than cars from foreign manufacturers,
which may be interpreted as some kind of home bias to occur in both magazines.
Contemporary and lagged values of new releases have also positive and statisti-
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cally significant coefficients. New models have, of course, a higher probability of
being reviewed.
Using random effects panel regressions for both samples more or less confirm
our results from simple probit methods (see column 3 in Tables 2 and 3).4 Again,
regression results suggest evidence for a media bias as well as for some kind of
home bias. However, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity leads to weaker
levels of significance for new releases as well as to a seemingly smaller media bias.
Table 2: Regression results for Auto, Motor & Sport
Probit Panel Probit IV Probit
Test Test Test
Ads 0.138 (0.00)*** 0.054 (0.00)*** 0.607 (0.00)***
Germany 0.882 (0.00)*** 0.994 (0.00)*** 0.270 (0.00)***
New releases 0.003 (0.00)*** 0.001 (0.05)** 0.001 (0.14)
New releasest−1 0.002 (0.00)*** 0.0004 (0.40) -0.0002 (0.61)
New releasest−2 0.002 (0.00)*** 0.001 (0.17) -0.0001 (0.82)
No of pages 0.0002 (0.63) 0.001 (0.20) -0.002 (0.00)***
Month dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Group dummies yes yes yes
Constant -1.550 (0.00)*** -1.601 (0.00)*** -0.935 (0.00)***
Obs. 11,167 11,167 10,331
Wald Test 1,285.69*** 417.58*** 1,656.29***
Test statistics from linear probability model
F-statistics of excluded Instru-
ments
44.67
Stock-Yogo critical value for 5%
max. IV rel. bias
21.31
Hansen J overid. test 11.62
(0.77)
Instrumental variables Market Share, New Registrationst−1–New Registrationst−8,
New Releasest+1–New Releasest+8
*, **, *** statistically significant on the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level. Robust p-values in parentheses.
When controlling for endogeneity by using instrumental variable probit regres-
sions somewhat different results can be observed. While instrumental variable
regressions still confirm the existence of a bias, the estimated effects are signifi-
cantly larger than before. Obviously, the coefficients in previous regressions are
4Note, that random effects are implemented on brand level.
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biased downwards. In case that a lower test probability drives manufacturers
to increase advertising activity in this specific magazine a negative relationship
between test probability and advertising volumes exists. When not controlling
for this endogeneity estimated parameters should in fact be downward biased.
However, since we are not able to control for unobserved heterogeneity the true
effect may be smaller than indicated by instrumental variable regressions.
Table 3: Regression results for Autobild
Probit Panel Probit IV Probit
Test Test Test
Ads 0.101 (0.00)*** 0.040 (0.01)*** 0.688 (0.00)***
Germany 0.640 (0.00)*** 0.734 (0.00)*** 0.129 (0.08)*
New releases 0.002 (0.00)*** 0.001 (0.40) 0.001 (0.34)
New releasest−1 0.002 (0.00)*** 0.001 (0.30) 0.0003 (0.51)
New releasest−2 0.002 (0.00)*** 0.0003 (0.55) 0.0002(0.73)
No of pages 0.001 (0.61) 0.001 (0.33) -0.004 (0.00)***
Month dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Group dummies yes yes yes
Constant -1.879 (0.00)*** -1.920 (0.00)*** -1.155 (0.00)***
Obs. 12,384 12,384 12,384
Wald Test 738.54*** 149.03*** 1,346.93***
Test statistics from linear proba-
bility model
F-statistics of excluded Instru-
ments
58.76
Stock-Yogo critical value for 5%
max. IV rel. bias
21.31
Hansen J overid. test 11.26
(0.79)
Instrumental variables Market Share, New Registrationst−1–New Registrationst−8,
New Releasest+1–New Releasest+8
*, **, *** statistically significant on the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level. Robust p-values in parentheses.
Concerning German manufacturers results are somewhat ambiguous. While for
AMS a home bias still holds, the coefficient of Germany is statistically signifi-
cant on a 10% level in the AB regression. Also contemporary as well as lagged
new car releases are no longer significant. This result may arise from the fact
that instrumental variables are highly correlated with some of our explanatory
variables.
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The economic significance of our instruments is confirmed by different test
statistics. As one can see from Table 2 and 3, F-statistics for both specifications
(AMS and AB) obtained from linear probability models are reasonably high and
therefore suggest the relevance of our instruments.5 Both values exceed the Stock-
Yogo critical value for a 5% maximum iv relative bias considerably. Also Hansen
J-test of over-identification indicates an adequate use of instrumental variables.
3 Conclusions and Outlook
As car manufacturers are important advertising customers for car magazines and
as furthermore advertising revenues are a major source for magazines’ total in-
come publishers may have severe incentives to slant car reviews towards the
preferences of the largest advertising customers.
This study analyzes a possible media bias in German car magazines caused by
the car manufacturers’ advertisements. Analyzing the impact of car producers’
advertising levels in the two leading German car magazines, we find evidence for
a biased selection of automobiles for single and comparative car tests. On the one
hand producers with high advertising volumes show a higher probability of being
reviewed also when controlling for endogenous advertising volumes. The results
are robust independently of which method is used: simple probit regressions,
panel techniques or instrumental variable regressions. Moreover, also evidence
for a significant home bias towards German manufacturers exists. As expected
also the releases of new models influence the test probability positively.
As we find evidence for the existence of biased test probability, our results
suggest further research into that direction. As a next step, the possible distor-
tions in the test results may also come into the focus of our analysis. Not only
the choice of cars but also the evaluation of the overall performance gives the
potential of possible biases.
5As instrumental variable probit models do not allow testing for weakness of instruments
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